Add HMQV implementation (and merge the old FHMQV into the new codebase)

pull/211/head
Uri Blumenthal 2016-07-01 14:19:41 -04:00
parent 20c3e1a5ef
commit 11b540b932
15 changed files with 913 additions and 2 deletions

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3081E0020101302C06072A8648CE3D0101022100FFFFFFFF00000001000000000000000000000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF30440420FFFFFFFF00000001000000000000000000000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC04205AC635D8AA3A93E7B3EBBD55769886BC651D06B0CC53B0F63BCE3C3E27D2604B0441046B17D1F2E12C4247F8BCE6E563A440F277037D812DEB33A0F4A13945D898C2964FE342E2FE1A7F9B8EE7EB4A7C0F9E162BCE33576B315ECECBB6406837BF51F5022100FFFFFFFF00000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFBCE6FAADA7179E84F3B9CAC2FC632551020101

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3081E0020101302C06072A8648CE3D0101022100FFFFFFFF00000001000000000000000000000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF30440420FFFFFFFF00000001000000000000000000000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC04205AC635D8AA3A93E7B3EBBD55769886BC651D06B0CC53B0F63BCE3C3E27D2604B0441046B17D1F2E12C4247F8BCE6E563A440F277037D812DEB33A0F4A13945D898C2964FE342E2FE1A7F9B8EE7EB4A7C0F9E162BCE33576B315ECECBB6406837BF51F5022100FFFFFFFF00000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFBCE6FAADA7179E84F3B9CAC2FC632551020101

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3081E0020101302C06072A8648CE3D0101022100FFFFFFFF00000001000000000000000000000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF30440420FFFFFFFF00000001000000000000000000000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC04205AC635D8AA3A93E7B3EBBD55769886BC651D06B0CC53B0F63BCE3C3E27D2604B0441046B17D1F2E12C4247F8BCE6E563A440F277037D812DEB33A0F4A13945D898C2964FE342E2FE1A7F9B8EE7EB4A7C0F9E162BCE33576B315ECECBB6406837BF51F5022100FFFFFFFF00000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFBCE6FAADA7179E84F3B9CAC2FC632551020101

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3081E0020101302C06072A8648CE3D0101022100FFFFFFFF00000001000000000000000000000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF30440420FFFFFFFF00000001000000000000000000000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC04205AC635D8AA3A93E7B3EBBD55769886BC651D06B0CC53B0F63BCE3C3E27D2604B0441046B17D1F2E12C4247F8BCE6E563A440F277037D812DEB33A0F4A13945D898C2964FE342E2FE1A7F9B8EE7EB4A7C0F9E162BCE33576B315ECECBB6406837BF51F5022100FFFFFFFF00000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFBCE6FAADA7179E84F3B9CAC2FC632551020101

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@ -16,6 +16,8 @@
#include "gfpcrypt.h"
#include "dh.h"
#include "mqv.h"
#include "hmqv.h"
#include "fhmqv.h"
#include "ecp.h"
#include "ec2n.h"
@ -213,6 +215,44 @@ struct ECMQV
#endif
};
//! Hashed Menezes-Qu-Vanstone in GF(p) with key validation,
/*! <a href="http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/176">HMQV: A High-Performance Secure Diffie-Hellman Protocol</a>
Note: this implements HMQV only. HMQV-C (with Key Confirmation) will be provided separately.
*/
template <class EC, class COFACTOR_OPTION = CPP_TYPENAME DL_GroupParameters_EC<EC>::DefaultCofactorOption, class HASH = SHA256>
struct HMQV
{
typedef HMQV_Domain<DL_GroupParameters_EC<EC>, COFACTOR_OPTION, HASH> Domain;
#ifndef CRYPTOPP_MAINTAIN_BACKWARDS_COMPATIBILITY_562
virtual ~HMQV() {}
#endif
};
typedef HMQV< ECP, DL_GroupParameters_EC< ECP >::DefaultCofactorOption, SHA1 >::Domain HMQV160;
typedef HMQV< ECP, DL_GroupParameters_EC< ECP >::DefaultCofactorOption, SHA256 >::Domain HMQV256;
typedef HMQV< ECP, DL_GroupParameters_EC< ECP >::DefaultCofactorOption, SHA384 >::Domain HMQV384;
typedef HMQV< ECP, DL_GroupParameters_EC< ECP >::DefaultCofactorOption, SHA512 >::Domain HMQV512;
//! Fully Hashed Menezes-Qu-Vanstone in GF(p) with key validation,
/*! <a href="http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/408">A Secure and Efficient Authenticated Diffie–Hellman Protocol</a>
Note: this is FHMQV, Protocol 5, from page 11; and not FHMQV-C.
*/
template <class EC, class COFACTOR_OPTION = CPP_TYPENAME DL_GroupParameters_EC<EC>::DefaultCofactorOption, class HASH = SHA256>
struct FHMQV
{
typedef FHMQV_Domain<DL_GroupParameters_EC<EC>, COFACTOR_OPTION, HASH> Domain;
#ifndef CRYPTOPP_MAINTAIN_BACKWARDS_COMPATIBILITY_562
virtual ~FHMQV() {}
#endif
};
typedef FHMQV< ECP, DL_GroupParameters_EC< ECP >::DefaultCofactorOption, SHA1 >::Domain FHMQV160;
typedef FHMQV< ECP, DL_GroupParameters_EC< ECP >::DefaultCofactorOption, SHA256 >::Domain FHMQV256;
typedef FHMQV< ECP, DL_GroupParameters_EC< ECP >::DefaultCofactorOption, SHA384 >::Domain FHMQV384;
typedef FHMQV< ECP, DL_GroupParameters_EC< ECP >::DefaultCofactorOption, SHA512 >::Domain FHMQV512;
//! EC keys
template <class EC>
struct DL_Keys_EC
@ -283,10 +323,10 @@ struct ECNR : public DL_SS<DL_Keys_EC<EC>, DL_Algorithm_ECNR<EC>, DL_SignatureMe
};
//! Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme, AKA <a href="http://www.weidai.com/scan-mirror/ca.html#ECIES">ECIES</a>
/*! Default to (NoCofactorMultiplication and DHAES_MODE = false) for compatibilty with SEC1 and Crypto++ 4.2.
/*! Choose NoCofactorMultiplication and DHAES_MODE = false for compatibilty with SEC1 and Crypto++ 4.2.
The combination of (IncompatibleCofactorMultiplication and DHAES_MODE = true) is recommended for best
efficiency and security. */
template <class EC, class COFACTOR_OPTION = NoCofactorMultiplication, bool DHAES_MODE = false>
template <class EC, class COFACTOR_OPTION = NoCofactorMultiplication, bool DHAES_MODE = true>
struct ECIES
: public DL_ES<
DL_Keys_EC<EC>,

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// fhmqv.cpp - written and placed in the public domain by Jeffrey Walton
// Shamelessly based upon Wei Dai's MQV source files
#include "pch.h"
#include "fhmqv.h"
NAMESPACE_BEGIN(CryptoPP)
void TestInstantiations_FHMQV()
{
FullyHashedMQV fhmqv;
}
NAMESPACE_END

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// fhmqv.h - written and placed in the public domain by Jeffrey Walton
// Shamelessly based upon Wei Dai's MQV source files
#ifndef CRYPTOPP_FHMQV_H
#define CRYPTOPP_FHMQV_H
/** \file
*/
#include "gfpcrypt.h"
#include "algebra.h"
#include "sha.h"
NAMESPACE_BEGIN(CryptoPP)
//! Fully Hashed Menezes-Qu-Vanstone in GF(p) with key validation,
/*! <a href="http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/408">A Secure and Efficient Authenticated DiffieHellman Protocol</a>
Note: this is FHMQV, Protocol 5, from page 11; and not FHMQV-C.
*/
template <class GROUP_PARAMETERS, class COFACTOR_OPTION = CPP_TYPENAME GROUP_PARAMETERS::DefaultCofactorOption, class HASH = SHA512>
class FHMQV_Domain: public AuthenticatedKeyAgreementDomain
{
public:
typedef GROUP_PARAMETERS GroupParameters;
typedef typename GroupParameters::Element Element;
typedef FHMQV_Domain<GROUP_PARAMETERS, COFACTOR_OPTION, HASH> Domain;
FHMQV_Domain(bool clientRole = true): m_role(clientRole ? RoleClient : RoleServer) {}
FHMQV_Domain(const GroupParameters &params, bool clientRole = true)
: m_role(clientRole ? RoleClient : RoleServer), m_groupParameters(params) {}
FHMQV_Domain(BufferedTransformation &bt, bool clientRole = true)
: m_role(clientRole ? RoleClient : RoleServer)
{m_groupParameters.BERDecode(bt);}
template <class T1>
FHMQV_Domain(T1 v1, bool clientRole = true)
: m_role(clientRole ? RoleClient : RoleServer)
{m_groupParameters.Initialize(v1);}
template <class T1, class T2>
FHMQV_Domain(T1 v1, T2 v2, bool clientRole = true)
: m_role(clientRole ? RoleClient : RoleServer)
{m_groupParameters.Initialize(v1, v2);}
template <class T1, class T2, class T3>
FHMQV_Domain(T1 v1, T2 v2, T3 v3, bool clientRole = true)
: m_role(clientRole ? RoleClient : RoleServer)
{m_groupParameters.Initialize(v1, v2, v3);}
template <class T1, class T2, class T3, class T4>
FHMQV_Domain(T1 v1, T2 v2, T3 v3, T4 v4, bool clientRole = true)
: m_role(clientRole ? RoleClient : RoleServer)
{m_groupParameters.Initialize(v1, v2, v3, v4);}
protected:
inline void Hash(const Element* sigma,
const byte* e1, size_t e1len, const byte* e2, size_t e2len,
const byte* s1, size_t s1len, const byte* s2, size_t s2len,
byte* digest, size_t dlen) const
{
HASH hash;
size_t idx = 0, req = dlen;
size_t blk = std::min(dlen, (size_t)HASH::DIGESTSIZE);
if(sigma)
{
Integer x = GetAbstractGroupParameters().ConvertElementToInteger(*sigma);
SecByteBlock sbb(x.MinEncodedSize());
x.Encode(sbb.BytePtr(), sbb.SizeInBytes());
hash.Update(sbb.BytePtr(), sbb.SizeInBytes());
}
hash.Update(e1, e1len);
hash.Update(e2, e2len);
hash.Update(s1, s1len);
hash.Update(s2, s2len);
hash.TruncatedFinal(digest, blk);
req -= blk;
// All this to catch tail bytes for large curves and small hashes
while(req != 0)
{
hash.Update(&digest[idx], (size_t)HASH::DIGESTSIZE);
idx += (size_t)HASH::DIGESTSIZE;
blk = std::min(req, (size_t)HASH::DIGESTSIZE);
hash.TruncatedFinal(&digest[idx], blk);
req -= blk;
}
}
public:
const GroupParameters & GetGroupParameters() const {return m_groupParameters;}
GroupParameters & AccessGroupParameters(){return m_groupParameters;}
CryptoParameters & AccessCryptoParameters(){return AccessAbstractGroupParameters();}
//! return length of agreed value produced
unsigned int AgreedValueLength() const {return GetAbstractGroupParameters().GetEncodedElementSize(false);}
//! return length of static private keys in this domain
unsigned int StaticPrivateKeyLength() const {return GetAbstractGroupParameters().GetSubgroupOrder().ByteCount();}
//! return length of static public keys in this domain
unsigned int StaticPublicKeyLength() const{return GetAbstractGroupParameters().GetEncodedElementSize(true);}
//! generate static private key
/*! \pre size of privateKey == PrivateStaticKeyLength() */
void GenerateStaticPrivateKey(RandomNumberGenerator &rng, byte *privateKey) const
{
Integer x(rng, Integer::One(), GetAbstractGroupParameters().GetMaxExponent());
x.Encode(privateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength());
}
//! generate static public key
/*! \pre size of publicKey == PublicStaticKeyLength() */
void GenerateStaticPublicKey(RandomNumberGenerator &rng, const byte *privateKey, byte *publicKey) const
{
const DL_GroupParameters<Element> &params = GetAbstractGroupParameters();
Integer x(privateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength());
Element y = params.ExponentiateBase(x);
params.EncodeElement(true, y, publicKey);
}
unsigned int EphemeralPrivateKeyLength() const {return StaticPrivateKeyLength() + StaticPublicKeyLength();}
unsigned int EphemeralPublicKeyLength() const{return StaticPublicKeyLength();}
//! return length of ephemeral private keys in this domain
void GenerateEphemeralPrivateKey(RandomNumberGenerator &rng, byte *privateKey) const
{
const DL_GroupParameters<Element> &params = GetAbstractGroupParameters();
Integer x(rng, Integer::One(), params.GetMaxExponent());
x.Encode(privateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength());
Element y = params.ExponentiateBase(x);
params.EncodeElement(true, y, privateKey+StaticPrivateKeyLength());
}
//! return length of ephemeral public keys in this domain
void GenerateEphemeralPublicKey(RandomNumberGenerator &rng, const byte *privateKey, byte *publicKey) const
{
memcpy(publicKey, privateKey+StaticPrivateKeyLength(), EphemeralPublicKeyLength());
}
//! derive agreed value from your private keys and couterparty's public keys, return false in case of failure
/*! \note The ephemeral public key will always be validated.
If you have previously validated the static public key, use validateStaticOtherPublicKey=false to save time.
\pre size of agreedValue == AgreedValueLength()
\pre length of staticPrivateKey == StaticPrivateKeyLength()
\pre length of ephemeralPrivateKey == EphemeralPrivateKeyLength()
\pre length of staticOtherPublicKey == StaticPublicKeyLength()
\pre length of ephemeralOtherPublicKey == EphemeralPublicKeyLength()
*/
bool Agree(byte *agreedValue,
const byte *staticPrivateKey, const byte *ephemeralPrivateKey,
const byte *staticOtherPublicKey, const byte *ephemeralOtherPublicKey,
bool validateStaticOtherPublicKey=true) const
{
byte *XX = NULL, *YY = NULL, *AA = NULL, *BB = NULL;
size_t xxs = 0, yys = 0, aas = 0, bbs = 0;
// Depending on the role, this will hold either A's or B's static
// (long term) public key. AA or BB will then point into tt.
SecByteBlock tt(StaticPublicKeyLength());
try
{
const DL_GroupParameters<Element> &params = GetAbstractGroupParameters();
if(m_role == RoleServer)
{
Integer b(staticPrivateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength());
Element B = params.ExponentiateBase(b);
params.EncodeElement(true, B, tt);
XX = const_cast<byte*>(ephemeralOtherPublicKey);
xxs = EphemeralPublicKeyLength();
YY = const_cast<byte*>(ephemeralPrivateKey) + StaticPrivateKeyLength();
yys = EphemeralPublicKeyLength();
AA = const_cast<byte*>(staticOtherPublicKey);
aas = StaticPublicKeyLength();
BB = tt.BytePtr();
bbs = tt.SizeInBytes();
}
else if(m_role == RoleClient)
{
Integer a(staticPrivateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength());
Element A = params.ExponentiateBase(a);
params.EncodeElement(true, A, tt);
XX = const_cast<byte*>(ephemeralPrivateKey) + StaticPrivateKeyLength();
xxs = EphemeralPublicKeyLength();
YY = const_cast<byte*>(ephemeralOtherPublicKey);
yys = EphemeralPublicKeyLength();
AA = tt.BytePtr();
aas = tt.SizeInBytes();
BB = const_cast<byte*>(staticOtherPublicKey);
bbs = StaticPublicKeyLength();
}
else
{
assert(0);
return false;
}
// DecodeElement calls ValidateElement at level 1. Level 1 only calls
// VerifyPoint to ensure the element is in G*. If the other's PublicKey is
// requested to be validated, we manually call ValidateElement at level 3.
Element VV1 = params.DecodeElement(staticOtherPublicKey, false);
if(!params.ValidateElement(validateStaticOtherPublicKey ? 3 : 1, VV1, NULL))
return false;
// DecodeElement calls ValidateElement at level 1. Level 1 only calls
// VerifyPoint to ensure the element is in G*. Crank it up.
Element VV2 = params.DecodeElement(ephemeralOtherPublicKey, false);
if(!params.ValidateElement(3, VV2, NULL))
return false;
const Integer& p = params.GetGroupOrder();
const Integer& q = params.GetSubgroupOrder();
const unsigned int len /*bytes*/ = (((q.BitCount()+1)/2 +7)/8);
Integer d, e;
SecByteBlock dd(len), ee(len);
Hash(NULL, XX, xxs, YY, yys, AA, aas, BB, bbs, dd.BytePtr(), dd.SizeInBytes());
d.Decode(dd.BytePtr(), dd.SizeInBytes());
Hash(NULL, YY, yys, XX, xxs, AA, aas, BB, bbs, ee.BytePtr(), ee.SizeInBytes());
e.Decode(ee.BytePtr(), ee.SizeInBytes());
Element sigma;
if(m_role == RoleServer)
{
Integer y(ephemeralPrivateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength());
Integer b(staticPrivateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength());
Integer s_B = (y + e * b) % q;
Element A = params.DecodeElement(AA, false);
Element X = params.DecodeElement(XX, false);
Element t1 = params.ExponentiateElement(A, d);
Element t2 = m_groupParameters.MultiplyElements(X, t1);
sigma = params.ExponentiateElement(t2, s_B);
}
else
{
Integer x(ephemeralPrivateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength());
Integer a(staticPrivateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength());
Integer s_A = (x + d * a) % q;
Element B = params.DecodeElement(BB, false);
Element Y = params.DecodeElement(YY, false);
Element t1 = params.ExponentiateElement(B, e);
Element t2 = m_groupParameters.MultiplyElements(Y, t1);
sigma = params.ExponentiateElement(t2, s_A);
}
Hash(&sigma, XX, xxs, YY, yys, AA, aas, BB, bbs, agreedValue, AgreedValueLength());
}
catch (DL_BadElement &)
{
return false;
}
return true;
}
private:
// The paper uses Initiator and Recipient - make it classical.
enum KeyAgreementRole{ RoleServer = 1, RoleClient };
DL_GroupParameters<Element> & AccessAbstractGroupParameters() {return m_groupParameters;}
const DL_GroupParameters<Element> & GetAbstractGroupParameters() const{return m_groupParameters;}
KeyAgreementRole m_role;
GroupParameters m_groupParameters;
};
//! Fully Hashed Menezes-Qu-Vanstone in GF(p) with key validation,
/*! <a href="http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/408">A Secure and Efficient Authenticated DiffieHellman Protocol</a>
Note: this is FHMQV, Protocol 5, from page 11; and not FHMQV-C.
*/
typedef FHMQV_Domain<DL_GroupParameters_GFP_DefaultSafePrime> FullyHashedMQV;
NAMESPACE_END
#endif

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@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
// hmqv.cpp - written and placed in the public domain by Uri Blumenthal
// Shamelessly based upon Jeffrey Walton's FHMQV and Wei Dai's MQV source files
#include "pch.h"
#include "hmqv.h"
NAMESPACE_BEGIN(CryptoPP)
void TestInstantiations_HMQV()
{
HashedMQV hmqv;
}
NAMESPACE_END

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@ -0,0 +1,303 @@
// hmqv.h - written and placed in the public domain by Uri Blumenthal
// Shamelessly based upon Jeffrey Walton's FHMQV and Wei Dai's MQV source files
#ifndef CRYPTOPP_HMQV_H
#define CRYPTOPP_HMQV_H
/** \file
*/
#include "gfpcrypt.h"
#include "algebra.h"
#include "sha.h"
NAMESPACE_BEGIN(CryptoPP)
//! Hashed Menezes-Qu-Vanstone in GF(p) with key validation,
/*! <a href="http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/176">HMQV: A High-Performance Secure Diffie-Hellman Protocol</a>
Note: this implements HMQV only. HMQV-C (with Key Confirmation) will be provided separately.
*/
template <class GROUP_PARAMETERS, class COFACTOR_OPTION = CPP_TYPENAME GROUP_PARAMETERS::DefaultCofactorOption, class HASH = SHA512>
class HMQV_Domain: public AuthenticatedKeyAgreementDomain
{
public:
typedef GROUP_PARAMETERS GroupParameters;
typedef typename GroupParameters::Element Element;
typedef HMQV_Domain<GROUP_PARAMETERS, COFACTOR_OPTION, HASH> Domain;
HMQV_Domain(bool clientRole = true): m_role(clientRole ? RoleClient : RoleServer) {}
HMQV_Domain(const GroupParameters &params, bool clientRole = true)
: m_role(clientRole ? RoleClient : RoleServer), m_groupParameters(params) {}
HMQV_Domain(BufferedTransformation &bt, bool clientRole = true)
: m_role(clientRole ? RoleClient : RoleServer)
{m_groupParameters.BERDecode(bt);}
template <class T1>
HMQV_Domain(T1 v1, bool clientRole = true)
: m_role(clientRole ? RoleClient : RoleServer)
{m_groupParameters.Initialize(v1);}
template <class T1, class T2>
HMQV_Domain(T1 v1, T2 v2, bool clientRole = true)
: m_role(clientRole ? RoleClient : RoleServer)
{m_groupParameters.Initialize(v1, v2);}
template <class T1, class T2, class T3>
HMQV_Domain(T1 v1, T2 v2, T3 v3, bool clientRole = true)
: m_role(clientRole ? RoleClient : RoleServer)
{m_groupParameters.Initialize(v1, v2, v3);}
template <class T1, class T2, class T3, class T4>
HMQV_Domain(T1 v1, T2 v2, T3 v3, T4 v4, bool clientRole = true)
: m_role(clientRole ? RoleClient : RoleServer)
{m_groupParameters.Initialize(v1, v2, v3, v4);}
protected:
// Hash invocation by client and server differ only in what keys
// each provides.
inline void Hash(const Element* sigma,
const byte* e1, size_t e1len, // Ephemeral key and key length
const byte* s1, size_t s1len, // Static key and key length
byte* digest, size_t dlen) const
{
HASH hash;
size_t idx = 0, req = dlen;
size_t blk = std::min(dlen, (size_t)HASH::DIGESTSIZE);
if(sigma)
{
if (e1len != 0 || s1len != 0) {
assert(0);
}
Integer x = GetAbstractGroupParameters().ConvertElementToInteger(*sigma);
SecByteBlock sbb(x.MinEncodedSize());
x.Encode(sbb.BytePtr(), sbb.SizeInBytes());
hash.Update(sbb.BytePtr(), sbb.SizeInBytes());
} else {
if (e1len == 0 || s1len == 0) {
assert(0);
}
hash.Update(e1, e1len);
hash.Update(s1, s1len);
}
hash.TruncatedFinal(digest, blk);
req -= blk;
// All this to catch tail bytes for large curves and small hashes
while(req != 0)
{
hash.Update(&digest[idx], (size_t)HASH::DIGESTSIZE);
idx += (size_t)HASH::DIGESTSIZE;
blk = std::min(req, (size_t)HASH::DIGESTSIZE);
hash.TruncatedFinal(&digest[idx], blk);
req -= blk;
}
}
public:
const GroupParameters & GetGroupParameters() const {return m_groupParameters;}
GroupParameters & AccessGroupParameters(){return m_groupParameters;}
CryptoParameters & AccessCryptoParameters(){return AccessAbstractGroupParameters();}
//! return length of agreed value produced
unsigned int AgreedValueLength() const {return GetAbstractGroupParameters().GetEncodedElementSize(false);}
//! return length of static private keys in this domain
unsigned int StaticPrivateKeyLength() const {return GetAbstractGroupParameters().GetSubgroupOrder().ByteCount();}
//! return length of static public keys in this domain
unsigned int StaticPublicKeyLength() const{return GetAbstractGroupParameters().GetEncodedElementSize(true);}
//! generate static private key
/*! \pre size of privateKey == PrivateStaticKeyLength() */
void GenerateStaticPrivateKey(RandomNumberGenerator &rng, byte *privateKey) const
{
Integer x(rng, Integer::One(), GetAbstractGroupParameters().GetMaxExponent());
x.Encode(privateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength());
}
//! generate static public key
/*! \pre size of publicKey == PublicStaticKeyLength() */
void GenerateStaticPublicKey(RandomNumberGenerator &rng, const byte *privateKey, byte *publicKey) const
{
const DL_GroupParameters<Element> &params = GetAbstractGroupParameters();
Integer x(privateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength());
Element y = params.ExponentiateBase(x);
params.EncodeElement(true, y, publicKey);
}
unsigned int EphemeralPrivateKeyLength() const {return StaticPrivateKeyLength() + StaticPublicKeyLength();}
unsigned int EphemeralPublicKeyLength() const{return StaticPublicKeyLength();}
//! return length of ephemeral private keys in this domain
void GenerateEphemeralPrivateKey(RandomNumberGenerator &rng, byte *privateKey) const
{
const DL_GroupParameters<Element> &params = GetAbstractGroupParameters();
Integer x(rng, Integer::One(), params.GetMaxExponent());
x.Encode(privateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength());
Element y = params.ExponentiateBase(x);
params.EncodeElement(true, y, privateKey+StaticPrivateKeyLength());
}
//! return length of ephemeral public keys in this domain
void GenerateEphemeralPublicKey(RandomNumberGenerator &rng, const byte *privateKey, byte *publicKey) const
{
memcpy(publicKey, privateKey+StaticPrivateKeyLength(), EphemeralPublicKeyLength());
}
//! derive agreed value from your private keys and couterparty's public keys, return false in case of failure
/*! \note The ephemeral public key will always be validated.
If you have previously validated the static public key, use validateStaticOtherPublicKey=false to save time.
\pre size of agreedValue == AgreedValueLength()
\pre length of staticPrivateKey == StaticPrivateKeyLength()
\pre length of ephemeralPrivateKey == EphemeralPrivateKeyLength()
\pre length of staticOtherPublicKey == StaticPublicKeyLength()
\pre length of ephemeralOtherPublicKey == EphemeralPublicKeyLength()
*/
bool Agree(byte *agreedValue,
const byte *staticPrivateKey, const byte *ephemeralPrivateKey,
const byte *staticOtherPublicKey, const byte *ephemeralOtherPublicKey,
bool validateStaticOtherPublicKey=true) const
{
byte *XX = NULL, *YY = NULL, *AA = NULL, *BB = NULL;
size_t xxs = 0, yys = 0, aas = 0, bbs = 0;
// Depending on the role, this will hold either A's or B's static
// (long term) public key. AA or BB will then point into tt.
SecByteBlock tt(StaticPublicKeyLength());
try
{
const DL_GroupParameters<Element> &params = GetAbstractGroupParameters();
if(m_role == RoleServer)
{
Integer b(staticPrivateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength());
Element B = params.ExponentiateBase(b);
params.EncodeElement(true, B, tt);
XX = const_cast<byte*>(ephemeralOtherPublicKey);
xxs = EphemeralPublicKeyLength();
YY = const_cast<byte*>(ephemeralPrivateKey) + StaticPrivateKeyLength();
yys = EphemeralPublicKeyLength();
AA = const_cast<byte*>(staticOtherPublicKey);
aas = StaticPublicKeyLength();
BB = tt.BytePtr();
bbs = tt.SizeInBytes();
}
else if(m_role == RoleClient)
{
Integer a(staticPrivateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength());
Element A = params.ExponentiateBase(a);
params.EncodeElement(true, A, tt);
XX = const_cast<byte*>(ephemeralPrivateKey) + StaticPrivateKeyLength();
xxs = EphemeralPublicKeyLength();
YY = const_cast<byte*>(ephemeralOtherPublicKey);
yys = EphemeralPublicKeyLength();
AA = tt.BytePtr();
aas = tt.SizeInBytes();
BB = const_cast<byte*>(staticOtherPublicKey);
bbs = StaticPublicKeyLength();
}
else
{
assert(0);
return false;
}
// DecodeElement calls ValidateElement at level 1. Level 1 only calls
// VerifyPoint to ensure the element is in G*. If the other's PublicKey is
// requested to be validated, we manually call ValidateElement at level 3.
Element VV1 = params.DecodeElement(staticOtherPublicKey, false);
if(!params.ValidateElement(validateStaticOtherPublicKey ? 3 : 1, VV1, NULL))
return false;
// DecodeElement calls ValidateElement at level 1. Level 1 only calls
// VerifyPoint to ensure the element is in G*. Crank it up.
Element VV2 = params.DecodeElement(ephemeralOtherPublicKey, false);
if(!params.ValidateElement(3, VV2, NULL))
return false;
// const Integer& p = params.GetGroupOrder(); // not used, remove later
const Integer& q = params.GetSubgroupOrder();
const unsigned int len /*bytes*/ = (((q.BitCount()+1)/2 +7)/8);
Integer d, e;
SecByteBlock dd(len), ee(len);
// Compute $d = \hat{H}(X, \hat{B})$
Hash(NULL, XX, xxs, BB, bbs, dd.BytePtr(), dd.SizeInBytes());
d.Decode(dd.BytePtr(), dd.SizeInBytes());
// Compute $e = \hat{H}(Y, \hat{A})$
Hash(NULL, YY, yys, AA, aas, ee.BytePtr(), ee.SizeInBytes());
e.Decode(ee.BytePtr(), ee.SizeInBytes());
Element sigma;
if(m_role == RoleServer)
{
Integer y(ephemeralPrivateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength());
Integer b(staticPrivateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength());
Integer s_B = (y + e * b) % q;
Element A = params.DecodeElement(AA, false);
Element X = params.DecodeElement(XX, false);
Element t1 = params.ExponentiateElement(A, d);
Element t2 = m_groupParameters.MultiplyElements(X, t1);
// $\sigma_B}=(X \cdot A^{d})^{s_B}
sigma = params.ExponentiateElement(t2, s_B);
}
else
{
Integer x(ephemeralPrivateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength());
Integer a(staticPrivateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength());
Integer s_A = (x + d * a) % q;
Element B = params.DecodeElement(BB, false);
Element Y = params.DecodeElement(YY, false);
Element t1 = params.ExponentiateElement(B, e);
Element t2 = m_groupParameters.MultiplyElements(Y, t1);
// $\sigma_A}=(Y \cdot B^{e})^{s_A}
sigma = params.ExponentiateElement(t2, s_A);
}
Hash(&sigma, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, agreedValue, AgreedValueLength());
}
catch (DL_BadElement &)
{
return false;
}
return true;
}
private:
// The paper uses Initiator and Recipient - make it classical.
enum KeyAgreementRole{ RoleServer = 1, RoleClient };
DL_GroupParameters<Element> & AccessAbstractGroupParameters() {return m_groupParameters;}
const DL_GroupParameters<Element> & GetAbstractGroupParameters() const{return m_groupParameters;}
KeyAgreementRole m_role;
GroupParameters m_groupParameters;
};
//! Hashed Menezes-Qu-Vanstone in GF(p) with key validation,
/*! <a href="http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/176">HMQV: A High-Performance Secure Diffie-Hellman Protocol</a>
Note: this implements HMQV only. HMQV-C (with Key Confirmation) will be provided separately.
*/
typedef HMQV_Domain<DL_GroupParameters_GFP_DefaultSafePrime> HashedMQV;
NAMESPACE_END
#endif

View File

@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
#include "dsa.h"
#include "dh.h"
#include "mqv.h"
#include "hmqv.h"
#include "fhmqv.h"
#include "luc.h"
#include "xtrcrypt.h"
#include "rabin.h"
@ -384,6 +386,240 @@ bool ValidateMQV()
return AuthenticatedKeyAgreementValidate(mqv);
}
bool ValidateHMQV()
{
std::cout << "\nHMQV validation suite running...\n\n";
//HMQV< ECP >::Domain hmqvB(false /*server*/);
HMQV256 hmqvB(false);
FileSource f256("TestData/hmqv256.dat", true, new HexDecoder());
FileSource f384("TestData/hmqv384.dat", true, new HexDecoder());
FileSource f512("TestData/hmqv512.dat", true, new HexDecoder());
hmqvB.AccessGroupParameters().BERDecode(f256);
std::cout << "HMQV with NIST P-256 and SHA-256:" << std::endl;
if (hmqvB.GetCryptoParameters().Validate(GlobalRNG(), 3))
std::cout << "passed authenticated key agreement domain parameters validation (server)" << std::endl;
else
{
std::cout << "FAILED authenticated key agreement domain parameters invalid (server)" << std::endl;
return false;
}
const OID oid = ASN1::secp256r1();
HMQV< ECP >::Domain hmqvA(oid, true /*client*/);
if (hmqvA.GetCryptoParameters().Validate(GlobalRNG(), 3))
std::cout << "passed authenticated key agreement domain parameters validation (client)" << std::endl;
else
{
std::cout << "FAILED authenticated key agreement domain parameters invalid (client)" << std::endl;
return false;
}
SecByteBlock sprivA(hmqvA.StaticPrivateKeyLength()), sprivB(hmqvB.StaticPrivateKeyLength());
SecByteBlock eprivA(hmqvA.EphemeralPrivateKeyLength()), eprivB(hmqvB.EphemeralPrivateKeyLength());
SecByteBlock spubA(hmqvA.StaticPublicKeyLength()), spubB(hmqvB.StaticPublicKeyLength());
SecByteBlock epubA(hmqvA.EphemeralPublicKeyLength()), epubB(hmqvB.EphemeralPublicKeyLength());
SecByteBlock valA(hmqvA.AgreedValueLength()), valB(hmqvB.AgreedValueLength());
hmqvA.GenerateStaticKeyPair(GlobalRNG(), sprivA, spubA);
hmqvB.GenerateStaticKeyPair(GlobalRNG(), sprivB, spubB);
hmqvA.GenerateEphemeralKeyPair(GlobalRNG(), eprivA, epubA);
hmqvB.GenerateEphemeralKeyPair(GlobalRNG(), eprivB, epubB);
memset(valA.begin(), 0x00, valA.size());
memset(valB.begin(), 0x11, valB.size());
if (!(hmqvA.Agree(valA, sprivA, eprivA, spubB, epubB) && hmqvB.Agree(valB, sprivB, eprivB, spubA, epubA)))
{
std::cout << "FAILED authenticated key agreement failed" << std::endl;
return false;
}
if (memcmp(valA.begin(), valB.begin(), hmqvA.AgreedValueLength()))
{
std::cout << "FAILED authenticated agreed values not equal" << std::endl;
return false;
}
std::cout << "passed authenticated key agreement" << std::endl;
// Now test HMQV with NIST P-384 curve and SHA384 hash
std::cout << endl;
std::cout << "HMQV with NIST P-384 and SHA-384:" << std::endl;
HMQV384 hmqvB384(false);
hmqvB384.AccessGroupParameters().BERDecode(f384);
if (hmqvB384.GetCryptoParameters().Validate(GlobalRNG(), 3))
std::cout << "passed authenticated key agreement domain parameters validation (server)" << std::endl;
else
{
std::cout << "FAILED authenticated key agreement domain parameters invalid (server)" << std::endl;
return false;
}
const OID oid384 = ASN1::secp384r1();
HMQV384 hmqvA384(oid384, true /*client*/);
if (hmqvA384.GetCryptoParameters().Validate(GlobalRNG(), 3))
std::cout << "passed authenticated key agreement domain parameters validation (client)" << std::endl;
else
{
std::cout << "FAILED authenticated key agreement domain parameters invalid (client)" << std::endl;
return false;
}
SecByteBlock sprivA384(hmqvA384.StaticPrivateKeyLength()), sprivB384(hmqvB384.StaticPrivateKeyLength());
SecByteBlock eprivA384(hmqvA384.EphemeralPrivateKeyLength()), eprivB384(hmqvB384.EphemeralPrivateKeyLength());
SecByteBlock spubA384(hmqvA384.StaticPublicKeyLength()), spubB384(hmqvB384.StaticPublicKeyLength());
SecByteBlock epubA384(hmqvA384.EphemeralPublicKeyLength()), epubB384(hmqvB384.EphemeralPublicKeyLength());
SecByteBlock valA384(hmqvA384.AgreedValueLength()), valB384(hmqvB384.AgreedValueLength());
hmqvA384.GenerateStaticKeyPair(GlobalRNG(), sprivA384, spubA384);
hmqvB384.GenerateStaticKeyPair(GlobalRNG(), sprivB384, spubB384);
hmqvA384.GenerateEphemeralKeyPair(GlobalRNG(), eprivA384, epubA384);
hmqvB384.GenerateEphemeralKeyPair(GlobalRNG(), eprivB384, epubB384);
memset(valA384.begin(), 0x00, valA384.size());
memset(valB384.begin(), 0x11, valB384.size());
if (!(hmqvA384.Agree(valA384, sprivA384, eprivA384, spubB384, epubB384) && hmqvB384.Agree(valB384, sprivB384, eprivB384, spubA384, epubA384)))
{
std::cout << "FAILED authenticated key agreement failed" << std::endl;
return false;
}
if (memcmp(valA384.begin(), valB384.begin(), hmqvA384.AgreedValueLength()))
{
std::cout << "FAILED authenticated agreed values not equal" << std::endl;
return false;
}
std::cout << "passed authenticated key agreement" << std::endl;
return true;
}
bool ValidateFHMQV()
{
std::cout << "\nFHMQV validation suite running...\n\n";
//FHMQV< ECP >::Domain fhmqvB(false /*server*/);
FHMQV256 fhmqvB(false);
FileSource f256("TestData/fhmqv256.dat", true, new HexDecoder());
FileSource f384("TestData/fhmqv384.dat", true, new HexDecoder());
FileSource f512("TestData/fhmqv512.dat", true, new HexDecoder());
fhmqvB.AccessGroupParameters().BERDecode(f256);
std::cout << "FHMQV with NIST P-256 and SHA-256:" << std::endl;
if (fhmqvB.GetCryptoParameters().Validate(GlobalRNG(), 3))
std::cout << "passed authenticated key agreement domain parameters validation (server)" << std::endl;
else
{
std::cout << "FAILED authenticated key agreement domain parameters invalid (server)" << std::endl;
return false;
}
const OID oid = ASN1::secp256r1();
FHMQV< ECP >::Domain fhmqvA(oid, true /*client*/);
if (fhmqvA.GetCryptoParameters().Validate(GlobalRNG(), 3))
std::cout << "passed authenticated key agreement domain parameters validation (client)" << std::endl;
else
{
std::cout << "FAILED authenticated key agreement domain parameters invalid (client)" << std::endl;
return false;
}
SecByteBlock sprivA(fhmqvA.StaticPrivateKeyLength()), sprivB(fhmqvB.StaticPrivateKeyLength());
SecByteBlock eprivA(fhmqvA.EphemeralPrivateKeyLength()), eprivB(fhmqvB.EphemeralPrivateKeyLength());
SecByteBlock spubA(fhmqvA.StaticPublicKeyLength()), spubB(fhmqvB.StaticPublicKeyLength());
SecByteBlock epubA(fhmqvA.EphemeralPublicKeyLength()), epubB(fhmqvB.EphemeralPublicKeyLength());
SecByteBlock valA(fhmqvA.AgreedValueLength()), valB(fhmqvB.AgreedValueLength());
fhmqvA.GenerateStaticKeyPair(GlobalRNG(), sprivA, spubA);
fhmqvB.GenerateStaticKeyPair(GlobalRNG(), sprivB, spubB);
fhmqvA.GenerateEphemeralKeyPair(GlobalRNG(), eprivA, epubA);
fhmqvB.GenerateEphemeralKeyPair(GlobalRNG(), eprivB, epubB);
memset(valA.begin(), 0x00, valA.size());
memset(valB.begin(), 0x11, valB.size());
if (!(fhmqvA.Agree(valA, sprivA, eprivA, spubB, epubB) && fhmqvB.Agree(valB, sprivB, eprivB, spubA, epubA)))
{
std::cout << "FAILED authenticated key agreement failed" << std::endl;
return false;
}
if (memcmp(valA.begin(), valB.begin(), fhmqvA.AgreedValueLength()))
{
std::cout << "FAILED authenticated agreed values not equal" << std::endl;
return false;
}
std::cout << "passed authenticated key agreement" << std::endl;
// Now test FHMQV with NIST P-384 curve and SHA384 hash
std::cout << endl;
std::cout << "FHMQV with NIST P-384 and SHA-384:" << std::endl;
FHMQV384 fhmqvB384(false);
fhmqvB384.AccessGroupParameters().BERDecode(f384);
if (fhmqvB384.GetCryptoParameters().Validate(GlobalRNG(), 3))
std::cout << "passed authenticated key agreement domain parameters validation (server)" << std::endl;
else
{
std::cout << "FAILED authenticated key agreement domain parameters invalid (server)" << std::endl;
return false;
}
const OID oid384 = ASN1::secp384r1();
FHMQV384 fhmqvA384(oid384, true /*client*/);
if (fhmqvA384.GetCryptoParameters().Validate(GlobalRNG(), 3))
std::cout << "passed authenticated key agreement domain parameters validation (client)" << std::endl;
else
{
std::cout << "FAILED authenticated key agreement domain parameters invalid (client)" << std::endl;
return false;
}
SecByteBlock sprivA384(fhmqvA384.StaticPrivateKeyLength()), sprivB384(fhmqvB384.StaticPrivateKeyLength());
SecByteBlock eprivA384(fhmqvA384.EphemeralPrivateKeyLength()), eprivB384(fhmqvB384.EphemeralPrivateKeyLength());
SecByteBlock spubA384(fhmqvA384.StaticPublicKeyLength()), spubB384(fhmqvB384.StaticPublicKeyLength());
SecByteBlock epubA384(fhmqvA384.EphemeralPublicKeyLength()), epubB384(fhmqvB384.EphemeralPublicKeyLength());
SecByteBlock valA384(fhmqvA384.AgreedValueLength()), valB384(fhmqvB384.AgreedValueLength());
fhmqvA384.GenerateStaticKeyPair(GlobalRNG(), sprivA384, spubA384);
fhmqvB384.GenerateStaticKeyPair(GlobalRNG(), sprivB384, spubB384);
fhmqvA384.GenerateEphemeralKeyPair(GlobalRNG(), eprivA384, epubA384);
fhmqvB384.GenerateEphemeralKeyPair(GlobalRNG(), eprivB384, epubB384);
memset(valA384.begin(), 0x00, valA384.size());
memset(valB384.begin(), 0x11, valB384.size());
if (!(fhmqvA384.Agree(valA384, sprivA384, eprivA384, spubB384, epubB384) && fhmqvB384.Agree(valB384, sprivB384, eprivB384, spubA384, epubA384)))
{
std::cout << "FAILED authenticated key agreement failed" << std::endl;
return false;
}
if (memcmp(valA384.begin(), valB384.begin(), fhmqvA384.AgreedValueLength()))
{
std::cout << "FAILED authenticated agreed values not equal" << std::endl;
return false;
}
std::cout << "passed authenticated key agreement" << std::endl;
return true;
}
bool ValidateLUC_DH()
{
cout << "\nLUC-DH validation suite running...\n\n";

View File

@ -71,6 +71,8 @@ bool ValidateCMAC();
bool ValidateBBS();
bool ValidateDH();
bool ValidateMQV();
bool ValidateHMQV();
bool ValidateFHMQV();
bool ValidateRSA();
bool ValidateElGamal();
bool ValidateDLIES();